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Style, then, is a verb, not as grammar alone might mislead us, a noun.
—Berel Lang1
The world is labor.
—Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri2
What or where is style? Is it everywhere in a work of art? Surely not, for then 
it would be merely a tautological designation of something for which we 
have a word: form. And yet, if it is not spread equally across the work or is not 
consubstantial with all of the work’s parts and their coordination, we are 
still left with an impression of the general rightness of Susan Sontag’s remark 
that when we speak of style, we speak “about the totality of a work of art.”3 
To speak about the work’s “totality” is not, however, necessarily to speak about 
all of its parts, or to speak about them all at once. Style is everywhere in the 
work, but perhaps not everywhere in the same mea sure.
For instance, if we regard an unusual piece of framing in a fi lm by Douglas 
Sirk as striking, formally par tic u lar, we would tend (as many critics have 
done) to suggest that this framing is exemplary of Sirk’s style— a style that dis-
tinguishes him from his anonymized Hollywood contemporaries (those 
directors whose works we do not study on the basis of their particularity). If 
we note that this framing, this shot is remarkable and is indicative of Sirk’s 
style, what of the shots that came before and will follow after it? Why do we 






the stylistically par tic u lar shot stands out? But surely its standing out as such 
depends on this ground. If this is so, then how can that ground be separated 
from the remarkable image? Is style the energy, agency, or intelligence that 
has suffused the work as a  whole, and that has determined the remarkable 
image and its relation to the less- remarkable parts with which it is coordi-
nated, and to which it is connected? Style then, would not merely consist in 
the remarkable image, but in the temporality of its appearance in relation to 
the temporality of the entire fi lm’s duration. Style might feel more palpably 
dense in one moment in the fi lm, but that density would depend— vitally—on 
the lighter, more transparent moments of the rest of the fi lm.
The problem is a tricky one— perhaps more so for modern aesthetics than 
for aesthetic theory in earlier periods in which style was the name and 
taxonomizing agent for the apprehension of types of aesthetic production 
bound together by geography, historical period, or school. Our contempo-
rary understanding of style tends to hinge on our valuation of the individual, 
the stylist, the author/director/artist who has distinguished him- or herself 
from others. (If everyone had the same style, style might not exist, we fear.) 
But what connects this later understanding of style as “individual” to earlier 
understandings is the fact that whether we tend to think of style as something 
“belonging” to an individual or to a group of individuals, the fact of its “belong-
ing to” remains the same. Style is something a person or a group has. It is a 
manner and a means of settling property disputes. (If it  were not, authenti-
cating works of art would not be the expensive business that it is.)4
What if, instead of thinking about style as something that an artist or 
artwork has, we thought of it as something the artist or artwork does? That is, 
what if we thought of style not as property, but as labor? We know that works 
of art get to be what they are because some labor has been expended in pro-
ducing them, but what if we place the emphasis exactly  here— on the work of 
the work, and on the making visible of that work as style? What follows are 
some attempts at thinking about the implications of such an emphasis. These 
are written as notes: provisional, partial, and incomplete.5
* *  *
If style is the signature of a group or an individual, then style is 
individuation- as- such, and individuation- as- subsumption (not quite disap-
pearance, but certainly a form of deindividuation), which is also to say that 
style is signature and erasure. Style is a way of laying claim to one’s work and 
the work one has done, but it is also the divestment of own ership as it is expe-
rienced by the individual. When talking about a group or period style, then 
style is the making obscure of the signs that give evidence of the relation 
between the work of art and the work— that of the individual, at least, who 
is recognizable as such— that has gone into it. Another way of approaching this 
would be to say that style is the materialization of particularity and is the 
appearance- as- effacement of a particularism by way of naming that partic-
ularism as the sign of its belonging to a larger generality (that of the group or 
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school, or that of the individual artist’s oeuvre). Style is also, we might say, a 
way of being one thing while also being another.
* *  *
When Meyer Schapiro refers to style as personality made visible, he 
means that style is a pro cess of exteriorization, of making an inside an out-
side.6 And in a nontrivial manner, we might want to emphasize his reference 
to style as a made thing, something that has been produced. It is a sign, or a 
trace, of human effort. Many commentators agree that style is an inappro-
priate category to bring to bear on the objects of nature. Kendall L. Walton 
argues that “if the style of something depends on what actions seem to have 
been performed in creating it, a necessary condition for something’s having 
a style is its seeming to have been created by the deliberate per for mance of 
some action.”7 This proposal— which seems fairly incontrovertible, or at least 
uncontroversial— should make us feel comfortable in thinking about style as 
work, or the mark of labor, the evidence that work has been done. But what 
special work has produced style, or what is special about the work that style 
embodies and discloses?
* *  *
When we “see” style, we see the mark of human labor, a density, an opac-
ity in the image/work/text. Style, when we “see” it, is something we cannot 
see through. We stare at it, but not through it. It is the material register— the 
substratum— of the work. It is no less material than other parts of the work’s 
surface that do not strike us (as style), but unlike those parts of the work’s sur-
face, the part that “is” style (that is marked as style) returns us to the material-
ity of the work.
* *  *
Style gathers together and separates and is, moreover, the name of this 
gathering and separation. It is a kind of effortful activity, perhaps a kind of 
labor. Style is repetition. Style, for us to understand it, has to be present or 
take place at least twice. Style is produced through repetition.
Labor is also repetition. It is labor’s repetition, as well as its repetitive 
privacy that encourages Hannah Arendt to oppose the category of labor to 
the category of work. In Arendt’s terms, labor is related to the fecundity of 
the world and the reign of necessity. Labor is inseparable from the life pro-
cess itself, from the things that are necessary for life to sustain itself. Work, 
or a work, meanwhile— and  here I am interested in thinking about the work 
of art— requires a kind of specialized labor to come into existence; it is the 
product and the practice (in Arendt’s terms) of “reifi cation,” of bringing 
something with some permanence into the world. A work has been produced 
“when an entirely new thing with enough durability to remain in the world 
as an in de pen dent entity has been added to the human artifi ce.”8
The work, for Arendt, extends from and, in a sense, or in some sense is 
mimetic of “the image or model whose shape guides the fabrication” of the 
work. This model, or idea, however, “does not disappear with the fi nished 
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product”9 in the way that, say, a peasant’s labor seems to be hard to trace in 
the fruit of agricultural labor— an apple, a pumpkin, a sack of cornmeal— fruit 
that will disappear in its consumption. Arendt’s distinction between work 
and labor is provocative but fails to account for the permeable boundary 
between these categories. Style may be the term that shows the distinction 
to be, if not entirely false, then at least faulty; the distinction obscures some 
of the things that might be most interesting about works of art. For if style is 
always— as it must be— a mode of repetition, this is because it always summons 
more work, more works. The artwork is never complete in itself: it is planted 
and cultivated in the humus of earlier work— the tilled soil of history and the 
history of the arts— and it demands that other works be produced in response 
to it. The work’s distinguishing style is the answer to and demand for other 
works; its call and response is necessarily incomplete.10
* *  *
In early modern art criticism and literary theory, good style, correct art 
making was a mode of being and making that eschewed style (in Schapiro’s 
terms), but that was, of course and nonetheless, something learned, per-
formed, made. The mode of stylized per for mance that effaces itself as style 
has gone, since Castiglione, under the name of sprezzatura (nonchalance).
Sprezzatura is the practice of making the diffi cult look easy. Labor disap-
pears into a seamless social per for mance, sublimated away by its own invisi-
ble efforts. If it starts looking hard, if it extrudes into the social and leaves a 
trace or a mark, the result is failure.
Avoid affectation in every possible way as though it  were some very rough and 
dangerous reef; and (to pronounce a new word perhaps) to practice in all things 
a certain sprezzatura, so as to conceal all art and make what ever is done or 
said appear to be without effort and almost without any thought about it. 
And I believe much grace comes out of this: because everyone knows the 
diffi culty of things that are rare and well done; wherefore facility in such 
things causes the greatest wonder; whereas, on the other hand, to labor and, 
as we say, drag forth by the hair of the head, shows an extreme want of grace, 
and causes everything, no matter how great it may be, to be held in little account.
Therefore we may call that art true art which does not seem to be art; nor 
must one be more careful of anything than of concealing it, because if it is 
discovered, this robs a man of all credit and causes him to be held in slight 
esteem.11
Would the failure to produce sprezzatura be style: the visibility of the artwork 
as such, as a made thing? Is style the excess of visibility, or just bad visibility? 
The disappearing act by which art disappears into itself through its own per-
for mance suggests an art that directs our attention not to art itself, not to the 
signifi er or to art’s material substrate, but rather to the things that art wants 
to say, depict, or describe. Having sprezzatura is to make art vanish into 
signifi cation— into the world, away from itself as a work of art, to disappear into 
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what Arendt calls the “fecundity” of the world, as if the work of art  were a 
work of nature.
There is no residue in the per for mance of sprezzatura. It no sooner appears 
than it withdraws into the seeming naturalness of its own appearance, its 
apparent identity with the natural fecundity of the world. Leaving no trace 
of its having been (art), however, according to Arendt, is not the mark of the 
“work” but rather “the mark of all laboring”: “it leaves nothing behind, that 
the result of its effort is almost as quickly consumed as it is spent.”12 The effort 
that has been poured into the per for mance of sprezzatura— and per for mance 
must be taken implicitly and obviously to mean something that has been 
done in public— must evaporate or  else be condemned to being seen as noth-
ing other than labor. Disappearance (the dematerialization of its effort), 
however, is a fate it must share with labor, the thing it most wants not to be.
Entirely successful sprezzatura— and surely there is no such thing or 
performance— would no longer interest us as art because it would be mistaken 
for nature. Kant’s defi nition of the relation between the work of art and the 
object of nature sounds awfully close to the discourse of sprezzatura:
Thus the purposiveness in the product of beautiful art, although it is certainly 
intentional, must nevertheless not seem intentional; i.e., beautiful art must be 
regarded as nature, although of course one is aware of it as art. A product of art 
appears as nature, however, if we fi nd it to agree punctiliously but not painstak-
ingly with rules in accordance with which alone the product can become what 
it ought to be, that is, without the academic form showing through, i.e., with-
out showing any sign that the rule has hovered before the eyes of an artist and 
fettered his mental powers.13
The crucial— if at times nearly indistinguishable— distinction between art 
and nature is central to what Alexander García Düttmann calls “serious” art. 
In his discussion of Kant’s defi nition of art “as a work that must act upon the 
beholder ‘as if it  were a mere product of nature,’ ” Düttmann places the empha-
sis squarely on the “as if”: “the ‘as if’ means that one should never actually 
mistake an artistic product for a product of nature” if one is not to lose a sense 
of what he (Düttmann) calls “the reality of the artwork.”14
The term sprezzatura is derived from the Italian word for disdain: sprezzo. 
The courtier- artist prescribed by Castiglione treats his social per for mance or 
the production of the work of art (itself always a form of social per for mance, 
indeed of social labor) with disdain. His attitude suggests that he is disdainful 
(sprezzante) of labor itself. Disdain is, moreover, reserved for those who fail 
to achieve sprezzatura’s weightlessness, or those who know little enough to 
believe that it really was all that easy.15 Thus, sprezzatura not only delimits an 
extremely ambivalent attitude toward work but also reveals itself to be a fi erce 
means of policing the social.
Of course, Castiglione nearly fails at the task he sets for art: to express 
himself, he must introduce into language the turgidity of a neologism— one 
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whose conjugation of sibilants,  trills, plosives, and affricates means to perform 
weightlessness— thus giving the game away.
* *  *
Alexander Pope speaks the language of sprezzatura, though the question 
of whether he actually performs it may be another matter. His work testifi es to 
the durability and the seductiveness of (not) being seen to work (too hard) 
as the model for artistic production.
From The Essay on Criticism:
True Wit is Nature to advantage dress’d,
What oft was thought, but ne’er so well express’d; ...  (297– 298)
Others for Language all their Care express,
And value books, as women men, for Dress:
Their praise is still,— the Style is excellent:
The Sense, they humbly take upon content ...  (305– 308)
But true Expression, like th’unchanging Sun,
Clears, and improves whate’er it shines upon,
It gilds all objects, but it alters none.
Expression is the dress of thought, and still
Appears more decent as more suitable;
A vile conceit in pompous Style express’d,
Is like a clown in regal Purple dress’d;
For diff’rent styles with diff’rent subjects sort,
As several garbs with country, town, and court.
Some by old words to fame have made pretence,
Ancients in phrase, meer moderns in their sense:
Such labour’d nothings, in so strange a style,
Amaze th’ unlearn’d, and make the learned smile. (315– 327)16
To be concerned or impressed by “Style” is to be caught up in exteriority, to 
miss the point. However, true style, the style propounded (and presumably 
exemplifi ed) by the poem is also caught up in surface effects. “True expres-
sion” is the phrase Pope invents for authentic style. Much of the conceptual and 
poetic work is accomplished  here through the tension and harmony between 
two words: express and dress. To express is to make an outside of an inside 
and to do so by an act of laborious force: it is to squeeze or force something 
out. Thus, “true expression” already wobbles ambivalently: it wants to sum-
mon effortlessness, but it is borne of work. This etymological ambivalence is, 
perhaps, one too easily claimed, and its ironies are slight in comparison to 
other tensions in the poem.
It is surprising that “true expression” should so insistently be invoked 
through a sartorial imaginary: it is the “dress of thought,” and therefore a sur-
face effect, able to be changed and discarded as occasion fi ts. “Expression” (an 
interiority rendered exterior) and “dress” (a pure exteriority, one that covers 
and, moreover, hides many of the organs of base “expression”) are most 
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forcefully related to one another when they function as the rhyming agents 
of several couplets:
True Wit is Nature to advantage dress’d,
What oft was thought, but ne’er so well express’d; ...  
Others for Language all their Care express,
And value books, as women men, for Dress: ...  
A vile conceit in pompous Style express’d,
Is like a clown in regal Purple dress’d; ...  
If to express correctly is to dress in the same manner, such dressing must 
still be “suitable” (a word that registers both a weak rhyme— with “still”— and 
a sartorial pun that reinforces the clothing meta phors deployed throughout 
and also summons, if only shadowily, the labor of the tailor).17 These two terms 
are not united in mere antagonism, as we might initially expect. Expression 
and dress are themselves neutral categories: both can be bad or good, true 
or false, suitable or ill- fi tting. Bad expression is a kind of bad wearing and 
suggests, moreover, a confusion of the part for the  whole, and of social cate-
gories, but a confusion that is obvious to spectators and listeners: we know 
when a clown is gussied up as a king— no one (at least of any substance) is 
fooled. Achieving good style— true expression— requires a versatile and exten-
sive wardrobe, one more likely possessed by those with the means and occa-
sion to wear “several garbs.” I doubt Pope thinks that only the born aristocrat 
has purchase on true expression, but true expression endows one— poetically 
at least— with something like the aristocrat’s demeanor, social knowledge, and 
power.
The fool, the practitioner of bad style, produces “labour’d nothings” 
that “in so strange a style, / Amaze the unlearn’d, and make the learned smile.” 
Even to have or exhibit a style is in itself already suspect: style is “strange” 
when and because it appears as such— as style— whereas “true expression” 
masks itself, appears so as to disappear. Labor names the problem of the 
appearance of style, not the problem of whether the style that appears is good 
or bad. The problem of the “labour’d nothing” is that it constitutes appear-
ance at all: it is heaviness, a kind of drag (in the several senses of that word). 
Good style leaves no residue and provides no occasion for the contemptu-
ous smiles of the “learned.” As for the “unlearn’d,” they would probably be 
better off getting back to work.
Pope’s account of style as bad appearance that is bad because it appears 
at all fi nds an interesting analogue in Marx’s account of the badly made tool 
in Capital Volume I: “A knife which fails to cut, a piece of thread which keeps 
on snapping, forcibly remind us of Mr. A, the cutler, or Mr. B, the spinner. In 
a successful product, the role played by past labour in mediating its useful 
properties has been extinguished.”18 Bad making interrupts the pro cess of 
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consumption or the functioning of the labor pro cess. However, a little later, 
Marx tells us that the labor pro cess, accounted for in what he calls “its simple 
and abstract terms elements,” names a “universal condition,” one that obscures 
the individual laborer’s stake in the labor pro cess: “The taste of porridge 
does not tell us who grew the oats.”19 But, of course, it is the bad making of 
Mr. A and Mr. B that tells us exactly who made the faulty knife and the weak 
thread. These makers make their labor— in its imperfection— too known to us 
and in so doing, they make the labor pro cess itself harder, that much more 
laborious, time- consuming, ineffi cient, and costly.
Without forcing too obstinately the analogy between Marx’s account of 
the labor pro cess and the production and appreciation of Pope’s “true expres-
sion” (itself an example of sprezzatura), we can connect the problem of “bad” 
art to bad labor, bad work— work that is imperfect because the labor condensed 
in it has revealed itself as such— as labor and as labored. The labor of Mr. A 
and Mr. B should not have been brought to our attention; their work should 
have remained private and unknown to us— locked in the twilit world of repeti-
tive labor. But as products of a kind of wrong making, Mr. A’s knife and 
Mr. B’s thread become objects of public notice. If style appears as such only 
when it is bad (or in Pope’s terms, “strange”), then maybe it would be fair 
to say that style is bad publicity (in both the weak and strong senses of that 
term).
* *  *
Viktor Shklovsky pursues the theorization of modern poetics in terms 
that sound curiously like Marx’s account of the badly made commodity. 
Shklovsky thinks of art as a kind of tool—“as device,” an instrument of labor, 
in other words. Art, like Mr. A’s knife, ought to make us work harder than 
would otherwise be necessary (if our tools  were perfect and perfectly made): 
“By ‘estranging’ objects and complicating form, the device of art makes per-
ception long and ‘laborious.’ ”20 The laboriousness that is desired  here is meant 
to wrench us out of accustomed habits of perception in which we do too little 
work, or  else work like automata. The stakes, for Shklovsky, are high: “Auto-
mization eats away at things, at clothes, at furniture, at our wives, and at our 
fear of war.”21
“Automization” also names the industrialization of drudgery that has 
characterized the working conditions of the laboring classes in modernity. 
Shklovsky’s invocation of the term raises the specter of socially oppressive 
forms of laboriousness. His account of the awkward laboriousness of serious 
art emits more of the artisanal workshop than the factory. For Theodor Adorno, 
serious art has been “bought with the exclusion of the lower classes,” with 
whom it nonetheless “keeps faith precisely by its freedom from the ends of 
the false universality.”22 (“False universality” is the pseudo- emancipation 
of the culture industry: the reduction of existence to exchange value.) The 
culture industry is a mode of art that also entails laboriousness: its products 
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“bear the impress of the labor pro cess” that its spectators “have to sustain 
throughout the day.”23 Adorno describes the spectator’s labor in front of the 
movie screen as so much routinized hard work— work that is made necessary 
by the movies themselves:
They are so designed that quickness, powers of observation, and experience 
are undeniably needed to apprehend them at all; yet sustained thought is out 
of the question if the spectator is not to miss the relentless rush of facts. Even 
though the effort required for his response is semi- automatic, no scope is left 
for the imagination. Those who are so absorbed by the world of the movie— by 
its images, gestures, and words— that they are unable to supply what really 
makes it a world, do not have to dwell on par tic u lar points of its mechanics 
during a screening.24
Broadly, therefore, we seem to have two types of artworks: (1) those that are 
made badly and whose awkward materiality slows the laborious pro cess by 
which they are perceived, consumed, and understood; and (2) those that 
demand a different sort of labor, one that is much closer to the types of work 
performed elsewhere in the world of paid wage labor. (Adorno: “Amusement 
under late capitalism is the prolongation of work.”)25 In either case, modern 
aesthetic theory testifi es to the enduring centrality of work as a meta phor (or 
accurate description) of what we do when we traffi c with works of art. Style— 
the manner in which something has been made— will determine and name 
the kind of work required of us by works of art.26
*  *  *
The concern with work as meta phor for and substance of the aesthetic 
experience is evidenced by serious modern art’s ambition to undo and over-
turn the hegemony of sprezzatura. Adorno hints at this in his entry on “Moral-
ity and Style” in Minima Moralia: “A writer will fi nd that the more precisely, 
conscientiously, appropriately he expresses himself, the more obscure the 
literary result is thought, whereas a loose and irresponsible formulation is at 
once rewarded with certain understanding.”27 Adorno agrees with Casti-
glione and Pope insofar as, like them, he recognizes that true expression 
requires hard work. The difference now lies in the fact that this work is uncon-
cealed by the work of art itself. Everyone now can see how much work has 
been expended in producing the artwork— and can consent, perhaps, in 
their mutual contempt for it. Once the work’s laborious origins are revealed 
to all (and not appreciated only by the learned), its stock suffers.
The artwork reveals the labor of its making through its style, the par tic u-
lar way in which it has been made, and the way that this par tic u lar way of 
being made is made public. Its way of being made, in fact, becomes the con-
stituting and defi ning feature of its social existence. For Adorno, the traces of 
the serious (or autonomous) work’s coming into being, the marks of its mak-
ing, are exactly what make it serious:
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Each and every important work of art leaves traces behind in its material and 
technique, and following them defi nes the modern as what needs to be done, 
which is contrary to having a nose for what is in the air. Critique makes this 
defi nition concrete. The traces to be found in the material and the technical 
procedures, from which every qualitatively new work takes its leads, are scars: 
They are the loci at which the preceding works misfi red. By laboring on them, 
the new work turns against those that left these traces behind.28
Adorno’s account of the work’s coming into being emphasizes the residue of 
actual labor, the agon of art making. We can call these “scars” the (serious) 
work of art’s style.
The scars of material labor that distinguish the work make it less easy to 
live with Arendt’s division of work from labor. Adorno’s use of this corporeal 
meta phor evokes other types of epidermal disfi guration— callouses, bruises, 
abrasions, skin rough and dark from long exposure to the elements— all of 
them marks of the laboring body. At the level of meta phor, at least, Adorno’s 
work of art will need to bear adequate witness to a world of work on the sur-
faces of its own disfi gured body. The work’s negativity may refuse false forms 
of emancipation offered by the culture industry. Whether this negativity 
actually constitutes a utopian promise, or at the very least “expess[es] the 
negativity of the culture which the different spheres [serious art and the cul-
ture industry] consitute,”29 the serious work of art’s style will at least demand 
that the problem of work remain unsublimated, a materially present, obdu-
rate, and quite possibly ugly imposition on the landscape of social existence.
* *  *
What bothers Adorno about the cinema— which overdetermines his con-
ceptualization of the culture industry— is that it delivers us right back into 
the logic of sprezzatura. For Adorno, the problem with the products of the 
culture industry is not that they do not possess style. The “culture industry,” 
actually, has “ceased to be anything but style” and is, moreover, “the most 
rigid of all styles.”30 In becoming only style, the culture industry reveals style’s 
“secret”: “obedience to social hierarchy.”31 Although this style is achieved at 
the expense of enormous labor, the reality of that labor, ideally— if the style is 
to achieve its aim— should remain invisible, or should at least seem effortless.
The entire point of Bordwell, Thompson, and Staiger’s The Classical Hol-
lywood Cinema32 is to trace what Rosalind Galt has called a “transvaluation 
of the obvious”;33 the book is a monument to latter- day, industrially pro-
duced sprezzatura. Bordwell in par tic u lar “gives privileged place not to the 
aberrant fi lm that breaks or tests the rules but to the quietly conformist fi lm 
that tries simply to follow them.”34 The Classical Hollywood Cinema is its own 
laborious monument to the self- effacing (or  else coercively effaced) labor 
power operative in the studio system. As latter- day sprezzatura, “classical” 
style is style- as- effacement. If it is seen or noticed, as such, it has failed its sty-
listic ambitions. However, given its historical situation inside modernity, a 
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period in which group style, if it exists, must exist alongside and in competition 
with a (perhaps hegemonic) understanding of style as the signature of the 
person or the personal, a classical fi lm that is “aberrant,” or that gets itself 
noticed, will also be that fi lm that expresses and materializes style as 
signature.
At the same time, and often (as in the case of Maya Deren or Kenneth 
Anger) just next door to Hollywood, avant- garde fi lmmaking exerts itself in 
the per for mance of heroic feats of cinematic labor that also intend them-
selves as (miniature) monuments to the force of individuating style.35  Here, 
though, labor may seem to exist in inverse proportion to the artifact’s legi-
bility as an example of “style.” For the total labor power required to make a 
single frame of a “classical Hollywood” fi lm may exceed the total labor power 
required to make an hour- long avant- garde fi lm, no matter how furiously the 
latter has been labored over.
Failure in the pursuit of cinematic sprezzatura entails spectators to 
become aware of the work required of them. Their labor, if it becomes pal-
pable to them, is the negative effect or index of the failure of labor power 
(that expended in the fi lm) to efface itself as labor. Somehow it has labored 
into the view— a dropped boom mike, peculiar editing, overacting. However, 
this failure may fi gure the triumph of individuation (within the system).36 
Or, in the case of art cinema, that mode that lies somewhere between the 
industrial mode of Hollywood and the artisanal mode of the avant- garde 
fi lm, the entire point would seem to be to coerce spectators into a more 
laborious relation to the fi lm. In front of a notoriously “diffi cult” fi lm, they 
must begin working on it or with it in order to capture a sense of its intended 
effects, which are provided for them by the self- effacing labor of the Holly-
wood fi lm.37
Manny Farber’s anti- intellectual division of cinema (or really all art forms) 
into “white elephant art” or “termite art” is derived entirely from the discourse 
of sprezzatura. “Termite art” (which is good) is mostly found in Hollywood 
cinema and is marked by its “eager, industrious, unkempt activity ...  It feels 
its way through walls of particularization, with no sign that the artist has any 
object in mind other than eating away at the immediate boundaries of his 
art.”38 If industriousness is the sign of good art (or the name by which such 
art is called), then, as of old, “laborious” is the term by which the bad object, 
“white elephant art” is named and shamed.39 (Farber’s term of abuse might 
owe something to H. G. Wells’s characterization of Henry James’s style being 
akin to a hippopotamus trying to pick up a pea.) The bad objects of white 
elephant art (whose makers include Truffaut, Antonioni, and Tony Richard-
son, but also De Kooning, Warhol, and Robert Motherwell) all exemplify “a 
yawning production of overripe technique shrieking with preciosity, fame, 
ambition.”40 Too intent on having style (the term itself is used as an insult in 
reference to Truffaut’s possession of it),41 these artists embarrass themselves 
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by making obvious their efforts at making work. Maybe in Farber’s terms, 
laboriousness names the work of the masterpiece, or an eight- hour factory 
shift, whereas industriousness better describes that of the entrepreneurial 
freelance critic, or the unself- conscious artist who feels that his work is “all 
expendable,” who profi ts by “forgetting this accomplishment [that of the work] 
as soon as it has passed.”42
* *  *
We might well be impatient with Adorno’s condemnation of the culture 
industry’s ease. Modernism’s love affair with diffi culty could be discounted 
as a mimetic fantasy. T. S. Eliot’s famous imperative that “poets in our civi-
lization, as it exists at present, must be diffi cult” is predicated precisely on a 
mimetic relation between aesthetic practice and social reality: “Our civiliza-
tion comprehends great variety and complexity, and this variety and complex-
ity, playing upon a refi ned sensibility, must produce various and complex 
results.” Being diffi cult— working hard at producing works of art that require 
hard work in return— is, for Eliot, a means by which the poet may “dislocate ... 
language into his meaning.”43 The making equivalent of the artwork’s sur-
face and the world to which it responds and bears witness is something we 
more ordinarily associate with realism (or at least with some powerful accounts 
of realism), in which the transparent availability of the realist text is mean 
to coincide with and mirror the world’s transparent availability to our senses. 
Adorno shares with Eliot a belief in modernism’s diffi culty as curative mime-
sis. From our contemporary vantage point, we might reasonably want to 
counter their (over)estimation of the diffi cult. Where exactly do we look for 
the evidence of what has been saved, salvaged, or  else staved off by diffi cult 
works of art? And how do we neatly and conclusively separate the culture 
industry’s “vernacular modernism” from those diffi cult forms of modernism 
that seem to require greater acts of concentration and attention from us?44 
And yet, it would be too easy to blame the invocation and practice of diffi culty. 
Diffi culty at least seems to have the virtue of making our consumption of 
artworks present to ourselves as such. The doxa of diffi culty may stake too 
much on a mimetic fallacy, but it is at least dedicated to making us sharers 
(however unequal) in some sort of burdensomeness.
*  *  *
In his meditation on the work of Luchino Visconti, Alexander García 
Düttmann has elaborated, embroidered, and extended Adorno’s insight that 
“ ‘artistic utopia’ would consist in making things ‘in ignorance of what they 
are.’ ”45 If art is not to be the repetition of what is given or the iteration of what 
is merely possible, it must contain “a not- knowing with regard to the making 
and a not- knowing with regard to what is being made.”46 Such making is not 
reducible to spontaneity, is not “a compulsive or unintentional movement”; 
indeed, it may draw on “technical training, experience, and expertise.”47 But 
what results is unpredictable and cannot be foreseen. If what results could 
have been predicted, the work would not have been worth making.
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For García Düttmann (in his sustained reading of Adorno via Visconti— 
and vice versa), the artwork that results from such a pro cess of making
has a transformative effect; it signals a difference ...  But it can only have a 
transformative effect because the artist does not know what he is making; he is 
unaware of what he is doing the moment he makes something in ignorance of 
what it is. It is not thus a matter of realizing possibilities, of awaiting their real-
ization, or indeed of mourning their missed or impossible realization. To clear 
the paths, to provide access to obstructed places, to shake off the shackles of 
heteronomy, it is essential that a reality be recognized which is nothing other 
than the change which has occurred. We see the world (differently).48
Such an account of the work of art’s production might sound something like 
Farber’s termite artist who has no “object in mind other than eating away at 
the immediate boundaries of his art.” Perhaps in their imagination of the 
moment of production, there is some affi nity between these two accounts. 
Farber’s termite art, however, is “all expendable,” to be forgotten as soon as 
it is made. Farber’s account is too enraptured of what García Düttmann calls 
“a compulsive or unintentional movement.” Farber’s termite art can account 
for a kind of “making in ignorance,” but misses seriousness. Seriousness enters 
in the work’s demand for “recognition,” which, in García Düttmann’s terms, 
is not just a seeing of something as what it is or intends itself to be, but also 
the site of an unpredictable encounter that is “the basis for the production of 
another reality.”49 Recognition is a more serious and demanding enterprise 
than the “forgetting [of] this accomplishment as soon as it has passed.”
Our vision and our awareness of style— of what the work is and how it is— 
could be thought of in relation to an understanding of the work as the embodi-
ment of a recognition of a change being made, of an action that has been taken 
in relation to the real, and of the unpredictable consequences of this action, 
this making. In this sense, style, as the sensible and sensual effect of an action 
taken, a decision made, suggests the “utopian” dimensions of the work of art. 
Art is not a surrogate for or a model of social action, but rather a medium for 
action that exists in the social world, and in which we can see the effects of 
actions and decisions and labors. Art— which is in the world and a part of the 
world’s real materiality— may make us wonder how impoverished our actions 
are in the world.
* *  *
Style is labor and the trace of labor (what labor leaves behind), an impo-
sition of the will on the world, and in a manner that has not been prescribed. 
It is thus unlike other forms of labor in which the outcome is predicted and 
predictable. Described in these terms, the laboriousness of the stylized work 
of art would seem to offer an account of labor that is happier than the familiar 
story of labor’s alienation. Is it happier— we might wonder initially— because 
style’s particularizing force has deanonymized the abstraction of labor and 
rendered its conditions and achievements legible? As Keston Sutherland has 
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argued, such “indexical inscription” would be a poor cause for celebration. 
Knowing how and by whom commodities are made and appreciating the 
particularity of their making does not absolve us from the crime of “eat[ing] 
human beings transubstantiated by industrial reduction ...  in every com-
modity on the market.”50
The telos of labor under capitalism (early, late, industrial, postindustrial) 
is always value. The capitalist extracts surplus labor from the worker so as 
to produce surplus value: this is the pro cess by which value is multiplied 
and capital is accumulated. The extraction of value from labor is the crux 
(and calvary) of the system of capitalism and depends— if surplus value is to 
be produced— on effi ciency, a disciplined labor force, and well- made com-
modities that can be used to produce more commodities and therefore more 
surplus value. As David Harvey has written, “The use- value of labor- power 
to the capitalist is that it is the one commodity that can produce value and 
hence surplus- value.”51 It would be unfortunate if the assimilation of style to 
labor  were to result in another victory for the valorization pro cess. However, 
it is exactly the valorization pro cess that may provide a better account of 
what thinking of style as labor offers us. If style is, as I have argued earlier, a 
kind of bad making that points back to its producers and their imperfect 
labor, then presumably labor like this is labor that will be ineffi cient for the 
production of value. If the knives and thread of Mr. A and Mr. B are simply 
too awkward, too faulty, and slow down the labor pro cess too completely, 
then they will have to be returned, or a refund will have to be demanded for 
their expense. Otherwise, they will foreclose the production of any value 
whatsoever. Works of art are certainly commodities and circulate in the com-
modity system. While we do not exactly use them in the same way that we 
might use knives or thread in the production of new commodities, they con-
stitute a part of the social materiality through, with, and in which we repro-
duce our own lives and our relationships to each other and the world. Style 
that reveals itself as such, presses its awkwardness on us, points back to the 
maker of its labor, and demands labor from us in turn is a means of making 
awkward the reproduction of our lives as always the same. Style might offer 
a bad way of producing surplus value, or a good way of producing new forms 
of value that do not support an economy of exchange, that do not function 
as exchange value.
Style is often a method of frustration, of dissatisfaction— or of an over-
satisfaction, a cloying surfeit, which produces disgust: it gives us too little, 
or too much, or  else gives us the wrong thing altogether. Adam Phillips has 
described the value of frustration as an impediment to the reproduction of 
the same: “the reason that frustration is important is because frustration con-
tains the possibility of discovering a new want. What usually happens is 
because we  can’t bear frustration, we fi ll it with a known want.”52 Presumably, 
the failure of an artwork to satisfy a known want was what some fi lmgoers at 
Stamford, Connecticut’s Avon Cinema  were complaining about when they 
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recently demanded a refund for the price of their tickets to see Terrence 
Malick’s The Tree of Life (USA, 2011).53 I do not mention this incident in order 
to belittle or condescend to the Avon’s disgruntled customers. They went 
into the theater expecting one thing and felt cheated when they  were given 
something  else. Presumably they  were turned off by The Tree of Life’s intense 
stylization. While they did not get their money back, their indignation at the 
fi lm’s style clearly upset the normal pro cess by which the commodity would 
ordinarily be consumed, assimilated, or put to work. While they may not 
have yet discovered a new want (or at least a desire for more fi lms by Terrence 
Malick), their encounter with the fi lm has, at the very least, decelerated the 
valorization pro cess. They may not have liked the fi lm, but their dislike of it 
is likely to have left an unforgettable impression.
* *  *
As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued, it is exactly in the 
postindustrial era that “the presence of labor at the center of the life world 
and the extension of social cooperation across society become total.”54 Per-
haps making labor central to our understanding of the work of art’s style 
could offer a desublimated account of artworks as laborious, but in a way 
that does not (pace Adorno) merely make a mockery of the hard work of 
“actual” labor (industrial, affective, intellectual, and so forth). Understand-
ing style as labor might be a way of asserting an interest in art’s inevitable 
dependence on such forms of labor and of asserting as well the desire that 
the conditions of labor and the nature of the value produced by it be other 
than what they are.
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